Gender Curve: An Analysis of Colleges\u27 Use of Affirmative Action Policies to Benefit Male Applicants by Franzese, Debra
American University Law Review
Volume 56 | Issue 3 Article 5
2007
Gender Curve: An Analysis of Colleges' Use of
Affirmative Action Policies to Benefit Male
Applicants
Debra Franzese
The American University Washington College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Franzese, Debra, “The Gender Curve: An Analysis of Colleges' Use of Affirmative Action Policies to Benefit Male Applicants.”
American University Law Review 56, no. 3 (February 2007): 719-750.
Gender Curve: An Analysis of Colleges' Use of Affirmative Action Policies
to Benefit Male Applicants
Abstract
This comment evaluates the constitutionality of affirmative action policies that benefit male students. Part I
sets out background information about potential causes of action and remedies for female students who
challenge affirmative action policies that benefit male students. Section A discusses the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the development of the law regarding universities’ use of racial
affirmative action policies. Section B discusses potential remedies under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”) and the similarity between Title IX and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
(“Title VI”). Section C discusses state remedies available to students under educational equity statutes,
human rights laws, and state equal rights amendments. Part II begins with a discussion of the relevant
distinctions between racial affirmative action policies and affirmative action policies benefiting male
applicants and sets forth a proposed framework to analyze male affirmative action policies. This Comment
concludes that affirmative action policies benefiting males are unconstitutional because of colleges’ reliance
on gender stereotypes when implementing them and because there is a lack of evidence to support a
legitimate pedagogical objective for the use of such programs.
Keywords
Male affirmative action, Title IX, Equal Protection, remedies
This comment is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol56/iss3/5
FRANZESE.OFFTOPRINTER 1/30/2007 12:46:14 PM 
 
719 
THE GENDER CURVE:  AN ANALYSIS OF 
COLLEGES’ USE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
POLICIES TO BENEFIT MALE APPLICANTS 
 
DEBRA FRANZESE∗ 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction.........................................................................................720 
I.  Background.................................................................................723 
A. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Affirmative Action Policies .....................723 
1. The Equal Protection Clause and race-based 
affirmative action cases ..................................................723 
2.   The Equal Protection Clause and the Court’s 
gender jurisprudence ....................................................726 
B. Affirmative Action Policies under Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972.........................................728 
         C.   Affirmative Action Policies and State Equality Statutes..... 732 
II.  Analysis ........................................................................................734 
A.  Affirmative Action Policies that Benefit Male Students 
Require a Different Framework of Analysis than Racial 
Affirmative Action Policies...................................................734 
B. Proposed Framework to Evaluate Affirmative Action 
Programs that Benefit Male Students .................................738 
1. Affirmative action policies implemented to benefit 
males do not constitute an important government 
interest............................................................................739 
                                                          
        ∗ Junior Staff Member, American University Law Review, Volume 56; J.D. 
Candidate, May 2008, American University, Washington College of Law.  First, I would like 
to thank my parents for their love and support.  I would also like to thank Professor 
Mary Clark, Washington College of Law and Professor Linda Wharton, Richard Stockton 
College of NJ, for reviewing drafts and providing helpful guidance throughout the 
publication process.  I would like to extend a special thank you to my Note and 
Comment Editor, Stephanie Casey, and the American University Law Review staff for 
their assistance. 
FRANZESE.OFFTOPRINTER 1/30/2007  12:46:14 PM 
720 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:3 
2. Colleges’ affirmative action policies that benefit 
male students are not substantially related to the 
goal of achieving diversity..............................................742 
  a.     Rigid point systems do not constitute flexible       
        affirmative action policies......................................743 
  b.     Admissions officers must conduct an            
          individualized evaluation of each applicant       
          including the consideration of gender neutral     
          factors .....................................................................744 
  c.    Affirmative action policies must not  
                              disproportionately benefit male applicants......... 745                                               
  d. Colleges must consider and reject gender         
neutral alternatives before adopting an 
affirmative action policy that benefits male 
applicants................................................................746 
  3.    Applicability of the gender equality framework to    
                        challenges brought under state anti-discrimination       
                        statutes ..........................................................................747 
Conclusion ...........................................................................................749 
INTRODUCTION 
Saving Our Sons,1 Raising Boys’ Achievement,2 The Male Minority,3 
and Where the Boys Aren’t:4  a look in a newspaper, magazine, or 
local bookstore reveals these titles and more.5  Females currently 
constitute approximately fifty-seven percent of students on college 
campuses nationwide,6 and the Department of Education predicts 
that this gender gap will increase to nearly sixty percent female by 
2010.7  Instead of cause for celebration, this lack of proportionality 
                                                          
 1. MICHAEL GURIAN & KATHY STEVENS, THE MINDS OF BOYS:  SAVING OUR SONS 
FROM FALLING BEHIND IN SCHOOL AND LIFE (2005). 
 2. RAISING BOYS’ ACHIEVEMENT IN SCHOOLS (Kevan Bleach ed., 1998). 
 3. Daren Fonda, The Male Minority, TIME.COM, Dec. 2, 2000, http://www.time. 
com/time/education/article/0,8599,90446,00.html. 
 4. Melana Zyla Vickers, Where the Boys Aren’t:  The Gender Gap on College Campuses, 
THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Jan. 1, 2006. 
 5. See Sarah Karnasiewicz, The Campus Crusade for Guys, SALON.COM, Feb. 15, 
2006, http://www.salon.com/mwt/feature/2006/02/15/affirmative_action/index_ 
np.html (explaining the wave of recent commentary about the war on boys, where 
commentators criticize the education system’s ability to educate boys effectively). 
 6. Mary Beth Marklein, College Gender Gap Widens:  57% Are Women, USA TODAY, 
Oct. 20, 2005, at 1A; see U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.:  NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., GENDER 
DIFFERENCES IN PARTICIPATION AND COMPLETION OF UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION AND 
HOW THEY HAVE CHANGED OVER TIME iii (2005), available at http://nces.ed.gov/ 
pubs2005/2005169.pdf (explaining that the percentage of female undergraduates 
increased from forty-two percent to fifty-six percent from 1970 to 2001). 
 7. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 36, 125 (2006), 
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2006/2006071.pdf (stating that the gender gap 
among undergraduate college students is expected to continue increasing through 
2015). 
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has become a source of concern for admissions officers8 and news 
commentators.9 
Growing concern over this gender gap has led some colleges to 
give male students an edge in the admissions process.10  For example, 
the University of Georgia (“UGA”) implemented an affirmative 
action policy that awarded additional points to male applicants.11  
However, when challenged, UGA’s policy was declared 
unconstitutional.12  Additionally, in March 2006, an admissions officer 
from Kenyon College published an op-ed article in the New York 
Times about the impact the gender gap has on the admissions 
process.13  She declared that because of demographic concerns, 
admissions committees consider males more valuable candidates than 
                                                          
 8. See Jennifer Delahunty Britz, Op-Ed., To All the Girls I’ve Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 23, 2006, at A25 (describing how the admissions committee’s concerns about 
the gender gap led to the determination that male candidates are more valuable 
than female candidates). 
 9. See, e.g., Karnasiewicz, supra note 5 (“On the one hand, you want to embrace 
the success of women . . . .  Yet, as more and more women substitute careers for 
having babies, I’ve come to see that we’re looking at a population crisis.”); Jennifer 
Olney, Concern Grows Over College Gender Gap, ABC7NEWS.COM, Apr. 3, 2006, 
http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=assignment_7&id=4036900 (arguing that 
boys start to fall behind in elementary school and that those who do go to college do 
not receive the assistance given to their female peers).  But see Tamar Lewin, A More 
Nuanced Look at Men, Women and College, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2006, at B8 (noting that 
the gender gap disappears among applicants from the highest income levels, and 
that the size of the gap may be due to the increased representation of women among 
older college students where women outnumber men two to one). 
 10. See Tamar Lewin, At Colleges, Women Are Leaving Men in the Dust, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 9, 2006, at A1 (quoting the Vice President for Enrollment at Dickinson College 
who explained “The secret of getting some gender balance is that once men apply, 
you’ve got to admit them.  So did we bend a little?  Yeah, at the margin, we 
did . . . .”).  But see Sandy Baum & Eban Goodstein, Gender Imbalance in College 
Applications:  Does it Lead to a Preference for Men in the Admissions Process?, 24 ECON. OF 
EDUC. REV. 665, 674 (2005) (concluding that the preference for male students 
becomes statistically significant only when the applicant pool is extremely 
unbalanced).  See generally Delahunty Britz, supra note 8, at A25 (concluding that “in 
this day and age of swollen applicant pools that are decidedly female . . . [t]he fat 
acceptance envelope is simply more elusive for today’s accomplished young 
women”). 
 11. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga. (Johnson I), 106 F. Supp. 2d 
1362, 1365 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (describing UGA’s admissions policy that awarded each 
male applicant an additional 0.25 points to his admission index), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1234 
(11th Cir. 2001). 
 12. See Johnson I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1363 (holding that the affirmative action 
policy that awarded preferences based on gender and race violated both Title VI and 
Title IX); see also Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga. (Johnson II), 263 F.3d 
1234, 1242 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001) (affirming the decision of the district court; however, 
since the parties only appealed on the basis of the racial preference, the court did 
not discuss the gender-based affirmative action plan). 
 13. See Delahunty Britz, supra note 8, at A25 (stating that one of the unintended 
consequences of the women’s movement is increased competition for women in 
undergraduate admissions). 
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females.14  While many college administrators do not openly admit to 
implementing male affirmative action policies, evidence suggests 
that, in certain circumstances, admissions officers give males an edge 
in the admissions process.15  In addition, many colleges have begun 
targeted campaigns to lure more males to campus.16 
This comment evaluates the constitutionality of affirmative action 
policies that benefit male students.  Part I sets out background 
information about potential causes of action and remedies for female 
students who challenge affirmative action policies that benefit male 
students.17  Section A discusses the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the development of the law regarding 
universities’ use of racial affirmative action policies.  Section B 
discusses potential remedies under Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”) and the similarity between Title IX 
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VI”).  Section C discusses 
state remedies available to students under educational equity statutes, 
human rights laws, and state equal rights amendments. 
Part II begins with a discussion of the relevant distinctions between 
racial affirmative action policies and affirmative action policies 
benefiting male applicants and sets forth a proposed framework to 
analyze male affirmative action policies.  This Comment concludes 
that affirmative action policies benefiting males are unconstitutional 
because of colleges’ reliance on gender stereotypes when 
implementing them and because there is a lack of evidence to 
support a legitimate pedagogical objective for the use of such 
programs. 
                                                          
 14. See id. (apologizing for the “demographic realities” that result in more 
rejection letters being sent to female students). 
 15. See Mark Clayton, Admissions Officers Walk a Fine Line in Gender-Balancing Act, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 22, 2001, at 11 (stating that in recent years the Office 
for Civil Rights of the Department of Education has received about twenty 
complaints each year about gender discrimination in the admissions process); Alex 
Kingsbury, Admit It:  Women Have a Man Problem, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 28, 
2006 (explaining that some colleges have skewed acceptance rates for male and 
female students, including William and Mary where the acceptance rate for males 
was forty-three percent while the acceptance rate for females was thirty-one percent). 
 16. See, e.g., Clayton, supra note 15 (explaining that admissions officers 
aggressively pursue interviews with male candidates); Karnasiewicz, supra note 5 
(noting that someone speaks about male recruitment efforts at the National 
Association of College Admission Counseling’s national conference each year). 
 17. Because of the standing requirement, women who applied for admission to a 
college with an affirmative action plan benefiting males and were subsequently 
rejected, would have the requisite “personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s 
allegedly unlawful conduct [that is] likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”  
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).   
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I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
Affirmative Action Policies 
The Equal Protection Clause provides one method of redress for 
female students to challenge affirmative action policies that benefit 
male students.18  While the Supreme Court has addressed the 
constitutionality of race-based affirmative action programs, the Court 
has not yet ruled on the issue of gender-based affirmative action 
policies.19  This Section first provides an overview of the Supreme 
Court decisions analyzing racial affirmative action policies.  It then 
reviews the Court’s gender jurisprudence under the Equal Protection 
Clause because these cases provide a more appropriate framework to 
analyze the gender affirmative action programs benefiting male 
students. 
1.  The Equal Protection Clause and race-based affirmative action cases 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
declares that “no state shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”20  The Supreme Court 
interprets the Fourteenth Amendment to regulate only state action, 
which places private discrimination beyond its reach.21  Therefore, 
under the Equal Protection Clause females can only challenge public 
colleges’ affirmative action policies that benefit male students. 
The Supreme Court applies different standards of review to analyze 
policies that discriminate against individuals based on certain 
characteristics.22  The Court recognizes race as a suspect 
                                                          
 18. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that classifications 
based on gender violate the Equal Protection Clause unless they are substantially 
related to an important government objective). 
 19. See Scott Jaschik, Affirmative Action for Men, INSIDE HIGHER ED., Mar. 27, 2006, 
http://insidehighered.com/news/2006/03/27/admit (noting that the Supreme 
Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of gender-based affirmative action 
policies in higher education institutions). 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 21. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000) (stating that the 
Fourteenth Amendment “erects no shield against merely private conduct, however 
discriminatory or wrongful” (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 n.12 
(1948))); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (“It is State action of a particular 
character that is prohibited.  Individual invasion of individual rights is not the 
subject-matter of the amendment.”). 
 22. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) 
(using strict scrutiny to evaluate state policies that discriminate against individuals on 
the basis of race); Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (using intermediate scrutiny to analyze 
challenges based on gender discrimination). 
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classification23 and applies strict scrutiny to evaluate policies that 
discriminate against individuals based on this immutable 
characteristic.24  Strict scrutiny is also used to evaluate programs that 
benefit racial minorities, including racial affirmative action policies.25  
To be constitutional, a policy that discriminates against individuals on 
the basis of race must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling 
government interest.26 
The Supreme Court has addressed universities’ use of racial 
affirmative action policies on numerous occasions.27  The Court first 
addressed this issue in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.28  
In that case, the Court held that it was unconstitutional for the 
university to reserve a fixed number of seats in the incoming class for 
racial minorities;29 however, the Court expressed approval for the use 
of race as one factor that admissions officers could consider when 
evaluating applicants.30  The Court recognized that offering 
admission to students with different racial backgrounds constitutes 
only part of achieving diversity and that using racial quotas to achieve 
diversity could undermine this goal.31 
                                                          
 23. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4 (suggesting that there may be a need 
for a more searching judicial inquiry when statutes disadvantage discrete and insular 
minorities). 
 24. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (concluding that “all 
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately 
suspect”). 
 25. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (holding that the 
standard of review does not change based on whether the policy harms or benefits 
racial minorities since without such judicial scrutiny it is impossible to determine 
which classifications are “remedial and what classifications are in fact motivated by 
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority”). 
 26. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (holding that the 
university’s asserted goal of diversity must constitute a compelling state interest and 
that the affirmative action plan must be narrowly tailored to achieve that objective). 
 27. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306; Regents of 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 28. 438 U.S. at 276-78 (explaining that the University of California Davis Medical 
School rejected Bakke, a white male, and that Bakke then alleged that the school’s 
affirmative action policy violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
 29. See id. at 319 (rejecting the use of racial quotas because students who do not 
belong to the class of racial minorities are “never afforded the chance to compete 
with applicants from the preferred groups for the special admissions seats”). 
 30. See id. at 316-17 (expressing approval for the admissions programs at Harvard 
and Princeton, which allowed an applicant’s race to be used as a “plus” in his or her 
admissions file); id. at 314 (noting that while universities have wide discretion in 
deciding which students to admit, individual rights may not be disregarded). 
 31. See id. at 315 (explaining that the state’s compelling interest in diversity 
includes admitting students with a range of talents, interests, and qualifications 
rather than admitting students based solely on their race). 
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More recently, the Court addressed the issue of racial affirmative 
action programs in Grutter v. Bollinger32 and Gratz v. Bollinger.33  In 
Grutter, the Court considered the constitutionality of the University of 
Michigan Law School’s affirmative action policy to enroll a “critical 
mass” of racial minorities in order to foster diversity in the incoming 
class.34  The Court held that diversity in a law school setting 
constituted a compelling state interest,35 and that the affirmative 
action policy was narrowly tailored because it conducted an 
individualized evaluation of each student’s application.36 
While the Court upheld the law school’s affirmative action policy in 
Grutter, in Gratz it found the program used by the undergraduate 
institution unconstitutional.37  The Court accepted the goal of 
diversity as a compelling state interest;38 however, the program failed 
the narrowly tailored prong because the policy awarded twenty points 
to every minority applicant based solely on his or her race.39  Both 
Grutter and Gratz emphasize the need for colleges to conduct 
individualized evaluations of each applicant.40  While schools may use 
                                                          
 32. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  The University of Michigan Law School rejected 
Grutter, a white female; although a racial minority with a similar LSAT score and 
GPA would have been admitted.  Id. at 316-17. 
 33. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).  Gratz and Hamacher both applied to the University of 
Michigan’s College of Literature, Science, and the Arts.  Id. at 244.  The university 
rejected them even though the admissions committee found Gratz to be well-
qualified and Hamacher to be qualified for admission.  Id. 
 34. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315-16 (explaining that the law school seeks to enroll a 
critical mass of students who belong to an ethnic group subject to a history of 
discrimination because these students make unique contributions to the law school 
environment). 
 35. See id. at 328-29 (according great deference to the law school’s determination 
that diversity contributed to the accomplishment of the school’s mission by creating 
livelier classroom discussions).  But cf. Jerry Kang & Mahzarin Banaji, Fair Measures:  A 
Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1070 (2006) 
(explaining that there is some controversy regarding whether diversity is actually a 
compelling state interest in educational institutions). 
 36. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335-36 (holding that even though the school tried to 
enroll a critical mass of minority students, this did not constitute a quota because 
“‘[s]ome attention to numbers,’ without more, does not transform a flexible 
admissions system into a rigid quota” (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 323 (1989))). 
 37. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275-76 (holding that the rigid point system used by the 
university violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
 38. See id. at 268-69 (referencing the Court’s analysis in Grutter, which deferred to 
the school’s educational judgment). 
 39. Id. at 273-74; see also id. at 279 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that 
the number of points awarded to minority applicants was disproportionate to the 
number of points awarded to students who contributed to the diversity of the school 
based on other characteristics, like leadership and community service). 
 40. See Mark W. Cordes, Symposium, Affirmative Action After Grutter and Gratz, 24 
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 691, 693, 729-39 (2004) (arguing that the Grutter and Gratz opinions 
prohibited the use of rigid admissions systems that award each racial minority a 
predetermined number of points based on race). 
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race as a factor, race cannot be the decisive factor in the admissions 
decision.41 
2.  The Equal Protection Clause and the Court’s gender jurisprudence 
The Equal Protection Clause also prohibits gender discrimination, 
although the Supreme Court analyzes gender-based policies under 
intermediate scrutiny.42  While the Court has not yet addressed the 
issue of gender-based affirmative action policies that benefit male 
applicants, the Court’s opinions in United States v. Virginia43 (“VMI”) 
and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan44 provide a framework to 
analyze colleges’ use of gender in admissions decisions.45  These 
opinions emphasize the need to conduct a searching judicial inquiry 
of the school’s asserted goal to ensure that the rationale does not rely 
on stereotypes about the capabilities of males and females.46 
A gender-based affirmative action policy would likely be evaluated 
under a lesser standard of scrutiny than race-based affirmative action 
because a majority of the Court has never identified gender as a 
suspect classification.47  As mentioned above, the Court analyzes 
gender classifications under intermediate scrutiny, which requires 
that the policy be substantially related to an important government 
interest.48  In VMI, the Court held that the government must have an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” for a policy that distinguishes 
among individuals based solely on their gender.49  Some 
commentators have argued that this standard of review is more 
demanding than traditional intermediate scrutiny, but this issue 
remains an open question until the Court next decides another 
                                                          
 41. See id. at 724-25 (noting that each student’s application must be read as a 
whole, and although race can be weighed more heavily than other factors, it must be 
evaluated in light of the applicant’s overall qualifications). 
 42. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) (holding that gender 
discrimination is unconstitutional unless the gender classifications are substantially 
related to an important governmental objective, and that administrative convenience 
is not an important governmental objective for gender-based classifications). 
 43. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 44. 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
 45. See Jaschik, supra note 19 (stating that although the Supreme Court has not 
addressed the constitutionality of an affirmative action policy that benefits male 
students, in VMI, the Court held that VMI needed an exceedingly persuasive 
justification to deny admission to female students based solely on their gender). 
 46. See infra note 136 (noting that it is not enough to simply rely on proffered 
benign justifications). 
 47. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (recognizing that only a 
plurality of the court identified sex as a suspect classification). 
 48. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).  
 49. 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996). 
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gender discrimination case.50  Based on the Court’s recent gender 
discrimination jurisprudence, colleges would need to have an 
exceedingly persuasive justification to implement an affirmative 
action program that benefited male students and prove that the plan 
was substantially related to its asserted goal.51   
In VMI, the Court held that Virginia Military Institute’s policy that 
denied admission to female students violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.52  VMI asserted that the institution contributed to educational 
diversity by offering students the option to attend a single-sex 
university.53  The Court, however, rejected VMI’s justification because 
at the time of the university’s inception, single-sex education for male 
students was the primary model of higher education in the United 
States.54  In addition, the Court held that VMI’s assertion that the 
admission of women would destroy its reliance on its adversative 
teaching method did not constitute an exceedingly persuasive 
justification because the school’s rationale for retaining the male-only 
admissions policy was based upon stereotypes about women’s 
abilities.55 
The Court’s holding in VMI reaffirmed its decision in Mississippi 
University for Women v. Hogan that individuals cannot be excluded 
from educational institutions based solely on their gender.56  In 
Hogan, the Court held that the Mississippi University for Women’s 
policy of excluding male students from its nursing school violated the 
                                                          
 50. See Deborah L. Brake, Reflections on the VMI Decision, 6 AM. U. .J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 35, 39-40 (1997) (arguing that the Court’s opinion in VMI moved the 
standard of review for gender classifications closer to strict scrutiny). 
 51. See Jaschik, supra note 19 (explaining that it is unlikely that Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, the author of VMI, would consider the inability to find a dance 
partner, one of the justifications for a gender affirmative action policy, an 
exceedingly persuasive justification).  
 52. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 519, 545-46 (holding that VMI’s admissions policy, which 
limited its enrollment to male students, violated the Equal Protection Clause because 
it relied on stereotypes about the capabilities of male and female applicants). 
 53. See id. at 524 (explaining that the district court agreed with VMI that the 
university fostered the state’s goal of educational diversity by offering a single-sex 
option where a majority of the public universities were co-educational). 
 54. See id. at 537 (arguing that at VMI’s inception equal educational 
opportunities were not available to men and women since scholars considered 
higher education to be dangerous for women). 
 55. See id. at 540 (rejecting VMI’s assertion that changes to accommodate women 
would be so radical that the school’s use of the adversative method would be 
destroyed because the school based its conclusion on stereotypes about the 
capabilities of the average woman rather than the individual capacities of a particular 
female applicant).  The adversative model of education is one that “features 
‘[p]hysical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, 
minute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination in desirable values.’”  Id. at 522 
(quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1421-22 (W.D.Va. 1991)).   
 56. See id. at 519 (holding that VMI cannot exclude qualified female applicants 
based on sex alone). 
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Equal Protection Clause.57  The Court rejected the university’s 
asserted goal of affirmative action for women because nursing is an 
occupation traditionally dominated by females.58  The university’s 
policy also failed the second prong of the inquiry; it did not 
substantially relate to the preservation of the school’s educational 
mission because the school failed to provide evidence that male 
students’ presence in the classroom would adversely affect female 
students’ performance.59 
B.  Affirmative Action Policies under Title IX of the Education Amendments 
of 1972 
In addition to the Equal Protection Clause, Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972 provides a statutory framework for 
female students to challenge affirmative action policies that benefit 
male applicants.  Title IX claims are often brought in conjunction 
with Equal Protection claims and could potentially provide a higher 
level of scrutiny.60  This Section includes an overview of Title IX’s 
statutory language and describes case law construing this statute. 
Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in all educational institutions 
that receive federal funding.61  Although Title IX contains absolute 
language about the prohibition on sex discrimination in all 
educational institutions, there are eight exceptions to this broad 
coverage.62  One of these exceptions relates to discriminatory 
admissions policies and limits the statute’s coverage, at the 
undergraduate level, to public coeducational institutions.63 
                                                          
 57. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982). 
 58. See id. at 729 n.14 (explaining that “[i]n 1980, women received more than 94 
percent of the baccalaureate [nursing] degrees conferred nationwide . . . and 
constituted 96.5 percent of the registered nurses in the labor force”).  
 59. See id. at 731 (“The uncontroverted record reveals that admitting men to 
nursing classes does not affect teaching style . . . [and] that the presence of men in 
the classroom would not affect the performance of the female nursing 
students . . . .”); see also id. at 730 (explaining that the school’s assertion that males’ 
presence in the classroom would adversely affect women is undermined by the fact 
that it allows male students to audit nursing classes). 
 60. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (noting that several federal 
courts have applied strict scrutiny to evaluate gender discrimination claims brought 
under Title IX). 
 61. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000) 
(“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”). 
 62. 20 U.S.C. § 1681; see Allison Herren Lee, Title IX, Equal Protection, and the 
Richter Scale:  Will VMI’s Vibrations Topple Single-Sex Education, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 37, 
56 (1997) (describing the eight exceptions to Title IX’s broad prohibition against 
gender discrimination). 
 63. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (“[I]n regard to admissions to educational 
institutions, this section shall apply only to institutions of vocational education, 
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Consequently, Title IX, which usually provides greater protection 
than the Equal Protection Clause,64 provides a limited remedy in the 
context of discriminatory admissions policies. 
Some federal courts have granted female students greater 
protection under Title IX by applying strict scrutiny to evaluate 
schools’ discriminatory policies.65  These courts have interpreted Title 
IX to provide greater protection than the Equal Protection Clause by 
analogizing it to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits the 
use of race discrimination by any program that receives monetary 
assistance from the federal government.66  Since Title IX and Title VI 
have nearly identical wording except for the designation of the 
protected class,67 many courts look to legal opinions analyzing Title 
VI when interpreting Title IX.68  These courts have concluded that 
Title IX’s legislative history supports the proposition that Congress 
assumed the statutory interpretation of Title IX would follow Title 
VI.69  For example, in Jeldness v. Pearce,70 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that since the statutes contained 
                                                          
professional education, and graduate higher education, and to public institutions of 
undergraduate higher education.”). 
 64. See David S. Cohen, Title IX:  Beyond Equal Protection, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 
217, 271 (2005) (“Textually, doctrinally, and theoretically, Title IX paints a more 
complete version of equality than the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 65. See Klinger v. Dep’t of Corr., 107 F.3d 609, 614 (8th Cir. 1997); Jeldness v. 
Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir. 1994); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 648 F.2d 1104, 
1106 (7th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga. (Johnson I), 106 F. 
Supp. 2d 1362, 1367 (S.D. Ga. 2000), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001).  See 
generally Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 695-96 (1979) (concluding that 
Congress modeled Title IX after Title VI and assumed that Title IX would be 
interpreted by analogy to Title VI).  
 66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). 
 67. Compare Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) 
(2000) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”), with 42 
U.S.C. § 2000(d) (“No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, 
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.”). 
 68. See Cohen, supra note 64, at 222 (“[T]he most common way courts and 
commentators compare Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause is indirectly, by 
comparing Title IX to Title VI.”); 117 CONG. REC. 28453, 30407 (1971) (explaining 
during congressional debate that some of Title IX’s language was taken directly from 
Title VI). 
 69. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696 n.16 (stating that the congressional debate 
concluded that the passage of Title IX only added the word “sex” to a current law 
[Title VI]); 118 CONG. REC. 5111, 5803 (1972) (explaining that “[e]nforcement 
powers include fund termination provisions—and appropriate safeguards—parallel 
to those found in Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act”). 
 70. 30 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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nearly identical language, the same level of protection should be 
accorded to both protected classes—race and gender.71 
Recently, in Johnson v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia 
(“Johnson I”)72 the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Georgia used strict scrutiny to evaluate a gender 
discrimination claim challenging the University of Georgia’s (“UGA”) 
affirmative action policy.73  UGA awarded an additional quarter point 
to all male students’ academic indices and a half point to all minority 
students’ academic indices.74  The court held that this affirmative 
action policy that favored males violated Title IX.75  This decision, 
which predates Grutter and Gratz, declined to recognize diversity in 
education as a compelling state interest because the university failed 
to provide quantitative or qualitative evidence to support its 
program.76  The district court did not address whether the plan was 
narrowly tailored because the court concluded that the goal of 
diversity was “so inherently formless and malleable that no plan can 
be narrowly tailored to fit it.”77 
Since UGA’s affirmative action plan provided a bonus to minority 
and male applicants, the district court’s opinion addressed both 
issues.78  The district court used strict scrutiny to evaluate both the 
racial and gender preferences.79  The court found that UGA’s 
admissions director could not articulate any need for gender diversity 
other than a basic assertion that “the state of Georgia is 49th in the 
                                                          
 71. Compare Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1227-28 (noting that in the absence of contrary 
authority gender discrimination challenged under Title IX should be evaluated 
under strict scrutiny, like race discrimination), with Cohen, supra note 64, at 244 
(“The meaning and applicability of Title VI are useful guides in construing Title 
IX . . . only to the extent that the language and history of Title IX do not suggest a 
contrary interpretation. . . .  For although two statutes may be similar in language 
and objective, we must not fail to give effect to the differences between them.”). 
 72. 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1365 (S.D. Ga. 2000), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 
2001). 
 73. See id. at 1365 (explaining that a female student challenged the school’s 
affirmative action policy that awarded a preference based on an applicant’s gender 
and race). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. at 1372 (finding that UGA relied on stereotypes and generalized 
statements to justify its assertion that diversity in education constituted a compelling 
interest, rather than providing concrete, quantifiable evidence). 
 77. Id. at 1374.  The court’s conclusion was grounded in the reasoning that “[t]o 
base racial preferences upon an amorphous, unquantifiable, and temporally 
unlimited goal is to engage in naked racial balancing . . . .”  Id. at 1373. 
 78. See id. at 1375 (evaluating the gender affirmative action plan using the same 
analysis as racial affirmative action plans because the school did not proffer a 
different rationale for that plan). 
 79. See id. at 1367 (explaining that since Title IX and Title VI use the same 
statutory language, “the standard for finding gender discrimination under Title IX is 
the same as Title VI’s standard for racial discrimination . . . i.e., strict scrutiny”). 
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country in the percentage of baccalaureate degrees going to males.”80  
The district court further explained that “gender preferencing would 
not even survive the less rigorous intermediate scrutiny 
[because] . . . [t]he desire to ‘help out’ men who are not earning 
baccalaureate degrees in the same numbers as women . . . is far from 
persuasive.”81  Since the parties did not raise the gender issue on 
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
focused on the constitutionality of the race-based preference,82 
whereas the district court’s opinion provides a preliminary analysis of 
the danger of using affirmative action policies to benefit male 
students.83  The Eleventh Circuit declined to address the issue of 
whether diversity constituted a compelling interest and instead 
evaluated whether the plan was narrowly tailored.84 
The circuit court implemented a four-factor test to evaluate 
whether the plan satisfied the narrowly tailored requirement.85  The 
opinion emphasized the importance of flexibility in the admissions 
program and explained that the goal of diversity should not 
constitute an end in itself, but rather a means for achieving the broad 
mix of cultures and ideas represented in society.86  The Eleventh 
Circuit held that the policy was not narrowly tailored since it 
provided a rigid set of points to minority applicants without an 
individual determination of their contribution to the school’s goal of 
diversity.87 
                                                          
 80. See id. at 1375 (concluding that “UGA’s asserted need for ‘gender diversity,’ 
then, obviously is a front for its gender-balancing desire”); see also id. (quoting UGA’s 
admissions director who asserted that there is a problem “[b]ecause our men are not 
completing college degrees at the same rate as our females are”). 
 81. Id. at 1376 n.10. 
 82. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga. (Johnson II), 263 F.3d 1234, 1242 
n.8 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that the defendants did not appeal the district court’s 
holding that the gender discrimination violated Title IX). 
 83. See Johnson I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1375 (concluding that “UGA’s gender bonus 
points, despite being cloaked in the language of ‘diversity-fostering,’ represent 
nothing more than inartfully veiled gender balancing”). 
 84. See Johnson II, 263 F.3d at 1244 (refusing to consider “whether or when 
student body diversity may be a compelling interest” because the university “plainly 
failed to show its policy is narrowly tailored to serve that interest”). 
 85. See id. at 1253 (concluding that the four factors should be:  “(1) whether the 
policy uses race in a rigid or mechanical way . . . (2) whether the policy fully and 
fairly takes account of race-neutral factors . . . (3) whether the policy gives an 
arbitrary or disproportionate benefit to members of the favored racial groups; and 
(4) whether the school has genuinely considered . . . race-neutral alternatives . . . .”). 
 86. See id. (explaining that a white applicant could, in some circumstances, 
provide a greater contribution to diversity than a non-white applicant based on his or 
her background). 
 87. See id. at 1254 (determining that the plan mechanically distributed a pre-
determined number of points to each minority applicant, which allowed minority 
students to be admitted at the expense of other students who could contribute more 
in terms of diversity). 
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C.  Affirmative Action Policies and State Equality Statutes 
The Equal Protection Clause and Title IX provide limited remedies 
to female students because they are only applicable to public 
undergraduate institutions.88  However, in several states these 
students could also challenge private colleges’ affirmative action 
policies under state educational equity statutes.  This Section 
provides an overview of the relevant state statutes and distinguishes 
them from the federal remedies. 
Many states have enacted comprehensive educational equity 
statutes or human rights acts that prohibit sex discrimination in 
educational institutions.89  While some of these statutes track the 
language of Title IX and apply admissions gender equality 
requirements only to public institutions, several states have statutes 
that prohibit such discrimination in both private and public 
undergraduate institutions.90 
When interpreting human rights acts and educational equity 
statutes, state and federal courts find analysis of analogous federal 
statutes instructive.91  However, courts have consistently emphasized 
that while analysis of federal law may be applied in appropriate 
circumstances, it does not constitute binding precedent.92  Therefore, 
courts can use the broad educational equity statutes to provide 
greater protection for individuals by allowing remedies against 
private colleges.  
The Minnesota Human Rights Act is one statute where the 
language differs from Title IX and could allow discriminatory 
admissions policies to be challenged at private colleges.93  The Act 
provides:  “It is an unfair discriminatory practice to discriminate in 
                                                          
     88. See supra note 21 (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment has a state 
action requirement); see also supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (describing 
Title IX’s admissions exception that excludes private undergraduate universities). 
     89. E.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 6625 (West 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-7-403 
(2005); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.41 (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4602(1) (2001); 
MINN. STAT. §§ 363A.03, 363A.13, 363A.23 (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-307 
(2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-22 (2002). 
      90. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 363A.13 (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-307 (2006); 24 
PA. STAT. ANN. § 5004 (West 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-22 (2002). 
      91. See Jacobsen v. Tillman, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1024 (D. Minn. 1998) 
(construing the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) using the same analysis as 
federal law claims); Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 
1999) (holding that Title VII case law applies when courts construe the MHRA). 
      92. See Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that courts apply the plain language meaning of the state statute where the language 
differs from developments in federal case law); Fahey v. Avnet, Inc., 525 N.W.2d 568, 
572 (Minn. 1994) (asserting that principles of Title VII law are merely instructive 
precedent for courts evaluating the MHRA). 
      93. See MINN. STAT. § 363A.13 (2001) (prohibiting educational institutions from 
excluding students based on gender). 
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any manner in the full utilization of or benefit from any educational 
institution, or the services rendered thereby to any person because 
of . . . sex . . . .”94  The statute further explicitly prohibits sex 
discrimination in educational institutions’ admissions’ policies.95  The 
MHRA defines the term “educational institution” to include colleges 
generally,96 and the statute contains no exception limiting its 
coverage to state universities.97   
For example, in Montgomery v. Independent School District No. 709, 
when a student alleged, under this Act, that he was a victim of same-
sex sexual harassment at school, the district court looked to the 
statutory language of the Act to evaluate the claim.98  The court 
construed the term “sexual harassment” to allow claims by students 
for same-sex harassment since the statutory language did not contain 
a requirement that the harassment be motivated by “sexual interest,” 
but rather that the harassment be “verbal or physical conduct of a 
sexual nature.”99  The court reached this decision even though the 
issue of whether same-sex harassment is actionable under Title IX 
had not been conclusively decided.100   
In addition to the educational equity statutes, students could also 
challenge these affirmative action policies under state equal rights 
amendments.  Although the Federal Equal Rights Amendment has 
not been enacted,101 twenty-two states have state equal rights 
amendments that guarantee equal rights for female citizens of their 
respective states.102  These amendments provide greater protection for 
                                                          
     94. MINN. STAT. § 363A.13(1) (2001). 
      95. MINN. STAT. § 363A.13(2) (2001) (“It is an unfair discriminatory practice to 
exclude . . . a person seeking admission as a student . . . because of . . . sex . . .”). 
     96. For purposes of the MHRA, educational institution is defined as “a public or 
private institution and includes an academy, college, elementary or secondary 
school, extension course, kindergarten, nursery, school system and a business, 
nursing, professional, secretarial, technical, vocational school; and includes an agent 
of an educational institution.”  MINN. STAT. § 363A.03(14). 
 97. See MINN. STAT. § 363A.23(1) (stating that while there is no general exception 
for private colleges, there is an admissions exception for private colleges that have 
been traditionally single-sex institutions). 
 98. See Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087-88, 
1090 n.9 (D. Minn. 2000) (looking to the plain statutory language to determine the 
definition of sexual harassment rather than relying on federal courts’ Title IX 
analysis). 
 99. Id. at 1087-88. 
 100. See id. at 1089-90 (holding that the language of the MHRA controls where 
there are differences between the statutory language of the MHRA and Title IX). 
 101. See Linda J. Wharton, State Equal Rights Amendments Revisited:  Evaluating their 
Effectiveness in Advancing Protection Against Sex Discrimination, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1201, 
1202 n.7 (2005) (explaining that although Congress passed the Federal Equal Rights 
Amendment (“ERA”) in 1972, the necessary three-fourths of the states failed to ratify 
it). 
 102. Id. at 1202. 
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female students than the Equal Protection Clause because often these 
amendments do not have a state action requirement and therefore 
their reach can be extended to private actors.103  The state equal 
rights amendments also raise the level of scrutiny beyond 
intermediate to strict scrutiny,104 requiring a party to assert that its 
plan is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government 
interest.   
While litigants often focus on federal remedies, state statutes and 
constitutions often offer broader protection of civil rights.105  In the 
context of affirmative action policies that benefit male students, the 
objectives of the state and federal statutes are the same—the 
eradication of gender discrimination.106  However, often the state 
statutes are broadly worded and can therefore encompass a greater 
variety of discriminatory acts than the federal statutes.107 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Affirmative Action Policies that Benefit Male Students Require a Different 
Framework of Analysis than Racial Affirmative Action Policies 
This Section will delineate the differences between racial 
affirmative action policies and affirmative action policies that benefit 
male students to demonstrate why the racial affirmative action cases 
do not adequately resolve the issue of the constitutionality of gender-
based affirmative action policies.  Various characteristics distinguish 
male affirmative action programs from racial affirmative action 
policies.  The racial affirmative action cases are based on the premise 
of historical discrimination against minorities and their subsequent 
underrepresentation in colleges and universities, yet these issues are 
                                                          
 103. See id. at 1229-30 (discussing how some states’ ERAs, like those of Montana 
and Rhode Island, expressly extend the prohibitions to private actors while other 
states, like Maryland and Pennsylvania, have broader language that could be 
interpreted to include private individuals). 
 104. See id. at 1240 (concluding that most state courts used their state ERAs to 
provide greater protection against gender discrimination by forcing states to meet 
the strict scrutiny standard rather than the intermediate scrutiny standard that 
federal courts use to evaluate claims of gender discrimination). 
 105. See id. at 1203 (explaining that “many state courts are interpreting state 
constitutions as independent, and often broader, sources of protection for individual 
liberties”). 
 106. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 363A.02(a)(5) (2001) (“It is the public policy of this 
state to secure for persons in this state, freedom from discrimination: . . . in 
education because of . . . sex . . . .”). 
 107. See infra Part II.3 (describing that the broad language of the MHRA could 
allow students to challenge colleges’ targeted recruitment campaigns for male 
students). 
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not applicable to male students.108  Additionally, racial affirmative 
action policies were designed to assist a disadvantaged class of 
applicants and disavowed the use of stereotypes about the abilities of 
minority applicants.109  However, colleges’ enactments of targeted 
recruitment policies to attract male candidates rely on impermissible 
stereotypes regarding the traditional gender roles of males and 
females.110   
The Court’s analyses of racial affirmative action policies have been 
based on the premise that African Americans historically lacked 
opportunities to attend institutions of higher education in the United 
States.111  Males as a group have never been the victims of 
discrimination in institutions of higher education.112  To the contrary, 
many universities in the United States limited their enrollment to 
male students until the early 1970s.113 
While the Grutter and Gratz opinions demonstrate a movement in 
affirmative action jurisprudence from a goal of diversity-as-difference 
toward a goal of diversity-as-integration,114 the need for an affirmative 
                                                          
 108. See, e.g., WOMEN IN HIGHER EDUCATION:  AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, 3 (Ana M. Martínez 
Alemán & Kristen A. Renn eds., 2002) (stating that Harvard College, the first 
American college, was founded in 1663 to “train young men for the ministry and for 
future leadership positions within colonial government”); Jaschik, supra note 19 
(explaining that the purpose of affirmative action policies is to remedy past 
discrimination, and males did not suffer from historical discrimination); Lewin, supra 
note 9 (finding that in the highest income groups men of all races were more likely 
than women to attend college and that the largest gender gap was among non-
traditional college students, where women outnumbered men two to one). 
 109. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 319-20 (2003) (noting the testimony of 
educational experts who explained that the enrollment of a “critical mass” of 
minority students is designed to eliminate racial stereotypes). 
 110. See infra notes 150-151 and accompanying text (describing colleges’ targeted 
recruitment efforts to increase male enrollment, including improving science and 
math programs since males traditionally dominate these majors); see also Bill 
Pennington, Small Colleges, Short of Men, Embrace Football, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2006, at 
A1 (explaining that the addition of a football team would increase male enrollment, 
not only because of the addition of the male players, but because more male than 
female students consider the addition attractive).  
 111. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (“The State 
certainly has a legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating, or eliminating 
where feasible, the disabling effects of identified discrimination.”). 
 112. See WOMEN IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 108, at 3-4 (describing that 
institutions of higher education were created for men and limited their enrollment 
to male students for decades). 
 113. See id. at 4 (noting that only a few institutions taught women before the Civil 
War, and the first college to offer co-education was Oberlin College in 1837, almost 
200 years after the founding of Harvard College); see also Kingsbury, supra note 15 
(explaining that Boston College, Johns Hopkins University, Brown, the University of 
Notre Dame, Dartmouth College, and Harvard did not become co-educational 
universities until the 1970s). 
 114. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Note, Grutter at Work:  A Title VII Critique of 
Constitutional Affirmative Action, 115 YALE L.J. 1408, 1414-16 (2006) (explaining that 
the goal of diversity-as-integration contemplates a forward looking focus to end racial 
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action plan to achieve diversity correlates to the historic 
discrimination against racial minorities.115  The diversity-as-integration 
concept seeks to reduce racial segregation in the workplace and 
society.116  Court opinions suggest that creating an environment that 
allows students to interact with diverse individuals fosters tolerance 
and a sense of community that extends to the workplace.117  However, 
colleges cannot support male affirmative action policies based on this 
theory since although women currently constitute a majority of 
college students, they continue to lag behind men in earning 
capacity,118 and males occupy the majority of the leadership positions 
in corporations, large law firms, and politics.119  On average, women 
earn only seventy-seven cents for every dollar earned by their male 
counterparts, and only six females hold the CEO positions at Fortune 
500 companies.120  Additionally, while females comprise nearly half of 
the population at the nation’s law schools, only 17.3% of the partners 
at large law firms are female.121  Therefore, a remedial rationale for 
an affirmative action policy benefiting male students would not 
constitute an exceedingly persuasive justification.122 
                                                          
segregation by using universities to breed tolerance and acceptance of individuals 
from different cultural and racial backgrounds). 
 115. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (upholding racial 
segregation in places of public accommodation). 
 116. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 113, at 1415 (arguing that “diverse universities 
are instrumental to realizing extrinsic social goals” and that “[i]ntegration signals 
that institutions and paths to leadership are open to members of all races”).  
 117. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (indicating that integration 
facilitates success in increasingly diverse workplace environments). 
 118. Marklein, supra note 6, at 1A; see also Ben Feller, Women Are Passing or Catching 
Men in College Areas Once Dominated by Men, MSN ENCARTA, http://encarta.msn.com/ 
encnet/departments/adultlearning/?article=womenpassingmen (last visited Sept. 7, 
2006) (explaining that even though women receive most of the diplomas conferred 
in fields like business and biology, women are still paid less than their male 
counterparts). 
 119. See, e.g., CRS Report for Congress, Membership of the 109th Congress 1, June 
13, 2006, available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RS22007.pdf 
(revealing that only eighty-four of the five hundred thirty- five members of Congress 
are female); Del Jones, Few Women Hold Top Executive Jobs, Even When CEOs are Females, 
USA TODAY, Jan. 27, 2003, at 1B (indicating that there are only six female CEOs at 
Fortune 500 companies). 
 120. Jake Ellison, Gender Gap Puzzles Colleges, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER REP., 
Dec. 23, 2002, at A1 (reporting that “women make up only 15.7 percent of the 
corporate officers in the United States’ 500 largest companies” and that women 
constitute only twenty-one percent of presidents at four-year colleges and 
universities). 
 121. Timothy L. O’Brien, Up the Down Staircase, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, at C1 
(describing that while women and men graduate from law school in equal numbers, 
women disappear at the highest tier of most large law firms). 
 122. Cf. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729-30 (1982) (rejecting 
Mississippi University for Women’s asserted remedial goal of compensating women 
for historical discrimination since nursing is predominantly a female occupation). 
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Additionally, male students represent a substantial proportion of 
the student population on college campuses.  Colleges assert the 
need for racial diversity based on the premise that students from 
diverse backgrounds bring different viewpoints to class discussions 
and the overall college environment.123  The diversity-as-integration 
doctrine envisions a sufficiently large number of minority students, so 
that students do not feel like representatives of their race.124  
However, while females constitute the majority of undergraduate 
students, it is unlikely that male students feel the need to act as 
spokesmen for their gender when nationwide they constitute forty-
three percent of college students.125  Contrastingly, African American 
and Hispanic students represent only thirteen percent and eleven 
percent of the college population, respectively.126 
While the Grutter opinion embraced diversity-as-integration, the 
narrowly tailored plan for implementation focuses on an 
individualized determination of each applicant’s qualifications, thus 
presenting an internal contradiction.127  The contradiction exists 
because for society to realize the benefits of diversity-as-integration 
there must be a significant number of racially diverse individuals on 
college campuses, yet a narrowly tailored program prohibits schools 
from focusing on numbers.128  One commentator argues, “[e]ven as 
Grutter’s narrow-tailoring discussion resists defining race in terms of a 
‘specific and identifiable’ contribution to diversity, it demands an 
inquiry linked to a static view of racial identity.”129  If courts applied 
the same analysis to evaluate a gender-based affirmative action 
program, a narrowly tailored plan would similarly assume that male 
and female students act in accordance with their socially constructed 
                                                          
 123. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315 (2003) (explaining that the 
University of Michigan Law School enacted a racial affirmative action policy to 
“achieve that diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone’s education and 
thus make a law school class stronger than the sum of its parts”). 
 124. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 114, at 1433-34 (explaining that the concept of 
diversity-as-integration requires universities to consider the total percentage of 
minority students on the campus because a higher percentage of minority students 
reduces discrimination). 
   125. THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION, supra note 7, at 36, 125. 
 126. U.S. Dep’t of Educ.:  Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Fast Facts, Sept. 1, 2005, 
http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=98. 
 127. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 114, at 1417-18 (explaining that individualized 
consideration of applicants’ contributions to diversity in Grutter illustrates the 
diversity-as-difference rationale because that rationale justifies the admission of 
students of different races based on the proposition that their race led to different 
experiences). 
   128. See id. at 1419 (arguing that to achieve the meaningful minority 
representation on campus that will further the goal of diversity-as-integration, 
schools need to focus on numbers). 
 129. Id. at 1418. 
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gender roles.130  The concept of diversity-as-difference inherent in 
gender affirmative action policies provides problems for the 
eradication of stereotypes about the roles of men and women, while 
the diversity-as-integration theme does not apply to males since they 
occupy society’s leadership roles.131  Therefore, affirmative action 
programs that benefit male students must be analyzed differently 
than race-based classifications. 
B.  Proposed Framework to Evaluate Affirmative Action Programs that Benefit 
Male Students 
This Section delineates and applies a proposed framework to 
review the constitutionality of gender-based affirmative action policies 
benefiting male students and concludes that such policies would fail 
intermediate scrutiny.  Then, this Section highlights the importance 
of state statutes prohibiting discrimination in educational institutions. 
The proposed framework to evaluate affirmative action plans that 
benefit male students must scrutinize whether such a plan constitutes 
an important government interest since males do not belong to a 
historically disadvantaged class.  The proposed framework evaluates 
affirmative action policies that benefit male students based on two 
main criteria:  (1) whether the plan relies on gender stereotypes 132 
and (2) whether the purpose of the plan is truly gender diversity 
rather than a mere attempt at gender balancing.133  These criteria are 
based on the elements necessary to satisfy the requirements of 
intermediate scrutiny, which the court developed in Mississippi 
University for Women v. Hogan and VMI.  These elements are central to 
the analysis since a rationale supporting the necessity of a male 
affirmative action policy cannot rely on assumptions about the 
                                                          
 130. See United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 541-42 (1996) (rejecting the 
use of stereotypes about the experiences of males and females based on socially-
constructed gender roles); cf. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 114, at 1418 (describing how 
the narrowly tailored requirement assumes that racial minorities have different 
experiences because they are racial minorities). 
 131. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text (describing males’ dominant 
role in business, law, and politics). 
 132. Cf. VMI, 518 U.S. at 540-41 (holding that although VMI may not have been 
the ideal school for all females, female students who sought such an adversative 
environment should have had the opportunity to attend the institution); Miss. Univ. 
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) (“Care must be taken in ascertaining 
whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions.”). 
 133. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga. (Johnson I), 106 F. Supp. 2d 
1362, 1375 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (refusing to defer to the school’s mere assertion of the 
need for diversity on campus where the administrators stated that they wanted to 
enroll an equal proportion of male and female students), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th 
Cir. 2001). 
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capabilities of males and females,134 and a plan that merely seeks to 
achieve an equal proportion of male and female students is not 
substantially related to the achievement of diversity.135  To determine 
whether the plan satisfies these criteria, it is necessary to conduct a 
searching inquiry of the asserted justification of the need for such a 
policy, rather than rely on the “mere recitation of a 
benign . . . purpose.”136 
1.  Affirmative action policies implemented to benefit males do not constitute 
an important government interest 
Because of the differences between race-based affirmative action 
policies and affirmative action policies benefiting male students, 
courts must require colleges to provide substantive evidence that the 
college’s interest in gender diversity constitutes an exceedingly 
persuasive justification.137  As in VMI and Hogan, the college must 
support the asserted justification with evidence that is based on 
legitimate educational objectives.138  This evidence cannot rely on 
stereotypes or assumptions about the capabilities of male or female 
students or their likely interests.139  Additionally, “[a] policy of 
diversity which aims to provide an array of educational 
opportunities . . . must do more than favor one gender.”140 
To sustain a male affirmative action policy, the college would need 
to provide evidence regarding the need for a greater percentage of 
male students on campus based on a lack of diversity.  In Johnson I, 
the University of Georgia was unable to articulate a legitimate 
                                                          
 134. See infra notes 165, 177, 179 and accompanying text (concluding that the 
Supreme Court prohibits reliance on stereotypes regarding the relative abilities of 
males and females). 
 135. See infra note 160 and accompanying text (explaining that a college’s attempt 
at gender balancing does not evidence a plan substantially related to achieving a 
diverse college class). 
 136. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728; see VMI, 518 U.S. at 535-36 (“In cases of this genre, 
our precedent instructs that ‘benign’ justifications proffered in defense of 
categorical exclusions will not be accepted automatically; a tenable justification must 
describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations for actions in fact differently 
grounded.”). 
 137. See Johnson I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1371 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (explaining that the 
university’s inability to explain how racial diversity advances the school’s educational 
objectives “bespeaks the inherently amorphous nature of this concept”). 
 138. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 535 (maintaining that Virginia did not show that VMI 
meant to diversify educational opportunities); Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730 (concluding 
that the state “failed to establish that the alleged objective is the actual purpose 
underlying the discriminatory classification”). 
 139. See infra note 148 (rejecting the use of stereotypes as a justification for 
distinctions based on gender). 
 140. Id. at 525. 
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rationale for the need to have gender diversity on campus.141  
Administrators at other colleges around the nation have proffered 
justifications such as social concerns about girls’ ability to find 
suitable marriage partners with a comparable educational level and 
unequal proportions of male and female students at dances.142  One 
administrator used circular reasoning to support a program that 
favored males in the admissions process by noting that since “men 
were so highly prized . . . some of them bec[a]me sexual predators,” 
implying that the school needed to increase the number of males on 
campus to make it safer for women.143 
While the University of Georgia asserted diversity as its goal once 
litigation began, none of the administrators articulated any academic 
need to have more males in the student body.144  The administrators 
did not suggest that greater gender diversity would present more 
lively class discussions or that a diverse college environment would 
help students prepare for the workforce and reduce prejudice.145  
Since the administrators did not articulate a genuine need for 
diversity, it seems that this justification was merely a pretext for the 
policy unsupported by any substantive data.146  Therefore, these 
                                                          
 141. Cf. Johnson I, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1375 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (acknowledging 
Director McDuff’s affirmative response in his deposition when questioned as to 
whether the school hoped the affirmative action policy would “produce a crafted 
class that is more proportionate in terms of male and female representation”), aff’d, 
263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 142. See Vickers, supra note 4 (relaying that administrators find a 50/50 split 
desirable in terms of social atmosphere).  But cf. Lewin, supra note 10 (explaining 
that colleges desire gender proportionality not only for social reasons but to attract a 
diverse mix of students to the campus); Vickers, supra note 4 (“The consequences go 
far beyond a lousy social life and the longer-term reality that many women won’t find 
educated male peers to marry.  There are also academic consequences, and 
economic ones.”). 
 143. Lewin, supra note 10. 
 144. See Johnson I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1375 (describing the testimony of the 
admissions director who was unable to articulate an academic need for a diverse class 
and explained that the discussion centered on enrolling a more proportionate 
number of male students); cf. Jaschik, supra note 19 (Jocelyn Samuels of the National 
Women’s Law Center explained that administrators did not provide educational 
justifications for the affirmative action programs but rather focused on social 
concerns based on stereotypes of the kind that Title IX sought to eliminate). 
 145. See Johnson I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1375 (revealing that UGA’s administrators 
only expressed concerns about enrolling a class that contained an equal proportion 
of male and female students); cf. id. at 1372 (explaining that the university 
administrators merely relied on a “truism that relationships between people of 
different backgrounds are based on something other than a shared background” and 
that “people from racially homogenous environments cannot ‘fully work 
cooperatively’ with individuals of a different race when they finally encounter 
them”). 
 146. Cf. United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 535-36 (1996) (asserting 
that colleges cannot advance benign rationales during the course of litigation that 
are unsupported by substantive evidence). 
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rationales do not assert a legitimate pedagogical goal for the need of 
gender diversity on campus. 
For diversity to constitute an exceedingly persuasive justification, it 
must be based on more than stereotypes and generalizations about 
the roles of men and women.147  Concerns about women’s inability to 
find a similarly educated husband or partner at a dance are the very 
types of traditional gender stereotypes that have trapped women for 
generations.148 
In addition to relying primarily on social and safety concerns, 
which stereotype women as the weaker sex, therefore needing 
protection,149 other schools concerned about gender imbalances on 
their campuses engaged in targeted recruitment campaigns based on 
stereotypical ideas regarding gender roles.150  These schools improved 
their engineering curriculum, highlighted math and science 
programs in admissions brochures, added more pictures of male 
students to school publications, and added football teams.151  Like 
VMI, which believed that its adversative method was inappropriate for 
female students, these schools used stereotypes to generalize about 
the programs and majors that would attract more males to their 
college campuses.152  However, Supreme Court jurisprudence dating 
back to the 1970s has rejected the idea of gender stereotypes, and 
programs that use such generalizations to increase diversity on 
                                                          
 147. See id. at 533 (holding that the justification advanced by the university cannot 
“rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or 
preferences of males and females”). 
 148. Cf. id. at 542-44 (labeling the gender stereotypes preventing women from 
entering VMI as “self-fulfilling prophecies” and likening them to the stereotypes that 
once prevented women access to legal and medical educations). 
 149. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (relaying that such 
notions of romantic paternalism “in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, 
but in a cage”). 
 150. See Fonda, supra note 3 (detailing a recruiting technique at the University of 
North Carolina that touts the school’s math and science programs to increase male 
enrollment since these majors traditionally appeal to male students); Karnasiewicz, 
supra note 5 (describing how some institutions use admission-oriented blogs to 
attract more male students, based on the stereotype that male students are more 
technology-savvy than female students). 
 151. See Karnasiewicz, supra note 5 (explaining the pointed recruitment 
campaigns that schools use to attract more male students, including “masculine” 
colors in admissions brochures and “pictures of smiling, confident young men”); 
Pennington, supra note 110 (describing how some small colleges are attracting male 
students by adding football teams).  The president of Shenandoah University 
explained that “[f]ootball is the best draw of qualified male applicants that there is 
anywhere.”  Id. 
 152. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 524 (describing VMI’s insistence that its distinctive, 
adversative method would need to undergo such radical alterations to accommodate 
women that it would be destroyed). 
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campus cannot meet the exceedingly persuasive justification 
standard.153 
The objective of assisting a disproportionately burdened class 
would also fail under this framework because males have not been 
subject to discrimination in education.154  In Hogan, the university 
stated that its goal was affirmative action for women.155  However, 
since nursing was a traditionally female occupation, the Court 
concluded that this justification could not support the school’s policy 
of denying admission to men.156  A similar argument was advanced in 
VMI, where the school asserted that single sex education for males 
created diverse educational opportunities for students.157  However, 
the Court rejected this justification because single-sex education 
institutions for men existed since the dawn of higher education in 
the United States and men had ample educational opportunities.158 
Colleges cannot merely rely on the fact that men constitute forty-
three percent of the student population on college campuses as a 
justification for these affirmative action policies.  Rather than 
increase diversity and tolerance in society, policies that promote the 
advancement of men to the detriment of women reinforce 
stereotypes about gender roles in society.159 
2.  Colleges’ affirmative action policies that benefit male students are not 
substantially related to the goal of achieving diversity 
For a college’s affirmative action policy to be substantially related 
to achieving the asserted goal of diversity, the school must implement 
a plan truly designed to increase the diversity of the class rather than 
                                                          
 153. Cf. id. at 532 (“[N]either federal nor state government acts compatibly with 
the equal protection principle when a law or official policy denies to women, simply 
because they are women, full citizenship stature—equal opportunity to aspire, 
achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on their individual talents and 
capacities.”). 
 154. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978) (contending 
that white males are not a “discrete and insular minority”). 
 155. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 727 (1982) (iterating the 
State’s argument that the exclusion of men constituted affirmative action for women, 
compensating for discrimination against females). 
 156. See supra note 60 (describing the demographics of the nursing labor force). 
 157. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 535 (acknowledging Virginia’s claim that single-sex 
education affords diversity, a pedagogical benefit, to some students). 
 158. See id. at 536 (“Neither recent nor distant history bears out Virginia’s alleged 
pursuit of diversity through single-sex educational options.  In 1839, when the 
Commonwealth established VMI, a range of educational opportunities for men and 
women was scarcely contemplated.”). 
 159. Cf. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729 (“MUW’s policy of excluding males from 
admission to the School of Nursing tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of 
nursing as an exclusively woman’s job.”). 
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simply enroll an equal proportion of male and female students.160  To 
determine whether this relationship exists, courts should evaluate the 
flexibility of the program, its consideration of gender-neutral factors, 
the disproportionate benefits to the favored class, and the existence 
of gender-neutral alternatives.161 
These factors comport with this Comment’s proposed gender-
equality framework because they ensure that colleges can articulate 
support for the asserted justification of diversity by relying on 
substantive pedagogical objectives rather than assumptions about the 
inherent capabilities of males and females.162  The Supreme Court has 
consistently rejected the argument that colleges and universities can 
simply assert their justification for a policy that distinguishes between 
individuals based on gender without subsequent judicial scrutiny.163  
Colleges need to provide substantive evidence that the plan includes 
an individual evaluation of all applicants and considers the diverse 
contributions that the student brings to the campus, other than his 
gender.164 
a. Rigid point systems do not constitute flexible affirmative action policies 
Systems that award points based on an applicant’s gender 
constitute rigid and mechanized determinations that do not fully 
evaluate the applicant’s talents and abilities to enrich the student 
experience on campus.165  A court would likely find an attempt to 
equalize the number of male and female students on campus for the 
sake of proportionality unconstitutional because of its similarity to a 
                                                          
 160. Cf. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga. (Johnson I), 106 F. Supp. 2d 
1362, 1375-76 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (rejecting a school’s admissions plan because the 
school’s asserted goal of diversity was more likely an attempt at gender balancing), 
aff’d, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 161. Cf. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga. (Johnson II), 263 F.3d 1234, 1253 
(11th Cir. 2001) (explaining four factors that should be used to evaluate whether an 
affirmative action plan is narrowly tailored to achieve the asserted objective).  
 162. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 550 (mandating that colleges cannot rely on 
generalizations about the supposed tendencies of the female gender and cannot 
deny opportunities to women “whose talent and capacity place them outside the 
average description”). 
 163. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728 (concluding that the school’s mere articulation of 
a benign objective does not prevent the Court from conducting its own inquiry of the 
policy’s real purpose). 
 164. Cf. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 273-74 (2003) (holding that colleges’ 
affirmative action policies must conduct individualized analyses of each applicant 
and cannot use a rigid point system to advantage one class of applicants). 
 165. See Cordes, supra note 40, at 724-25 (concluding that Grutter and Gratz 
mandate individualized evaluations of each applicant’s contribution to the campus’ 
diversity); see also VMI, 518 U.S. at 540-41 (concluding that VMI must conduct an 
individual analysis of a female applicant’s qualifications that may enrich the student 
body rather than excluding her based on gender stereotypes about her ability to 
succeed in an adversative environment). 
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quota system and the lack of individual evaluation of all applicants.166  
Rigid admissions standards that do not take account of the 
individual’s fit with the educational institution are similar to VMI’s 
admissions criteria that rejected female applicants based solely on 
their sex.167 
To be constitutional, the affirmative action plan needs to include 
an individualized determination regarding the fitness of each 
applicant and his or her contribution to the diversity of the incoming 
class.168  The evaluation of each student’s background would require 
the admissions committee to look beyond the student’s gender to see 
the contribution that he or she would make to the school rather than 
relying on stereotypes about the inherent abilities, experiences, and 
interests of male and female students. 169    
b.  Admissions officers must conduct an individualized evaluation of each 
applicant including the consideration of gender neutral factors 
To be substantially related to the college’s asserted objective, the 
school’s affirmative action policy must consider all of an applicant’s 
qualifications that could contribute to campus diversity.170  The 
consideration of gender-neutral factors, including potential major, 
leadership experience, extracurricular activities, community service, 
hardships, and other factors that provide a comparable “plus” to a 
student’s application would increase the likelihood of a constitutional 
program.171  Examining gender-neutral factors of each applicant 
ensures that students are evaluated based on their actual 
                                                          
 166. Cf. Johnson I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1371 (“[M]ere racial balancing (i.e. 
proportional racial representation for its own sake) is clearly unconstitutional.” 
(citing Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 497 U.S. 547, 614 (1990) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting))). 
 167. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 541-42 (asserting that VMI cannot exclude all female 
applicants simply because the average female might not meet VMI’s rigorous physical 
standards). 
 168. Cf. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273-74 (requiring colleges to evaluate each individual’s 
ability to contribute to the school’s diversity rather than assuming that a student will 
make certain contributions based on an innate characteristic).  
 169. Cf. VMI, 518 U.S. at 541 (asserting that “[s]tate actors controlling gates to 
opportunity, we have instructed, may not exclude qualified individuals based on 
‘fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females’” (quoting 
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982)). 
   170. Cf. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271 (describing that all of a student’s attributes should 
be considered in the admissions process and the presence of one single characteristic 
does not automatically guarantee that the student will make that particular college 
campus more diverse). 
 171. Cf. id. at 279 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that the number of 
points awarded to minority applicants was disproportionate to the number of points 
awarded to students who contributed to the diversity of the school based on other 
characteristics, like leadership). 
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qualifications rather than assumptions based on their perceived 
contribution because of their gender.172  Admissions programs that 
consider gender-neutral factors to add diversity to the class are more 
legitimate in their goal of truly seeking diversity rather than trying to 
achieve gender proportionality. 
c.  Affirmative action policies must not disproportionately benefit male 
applicants 
An affirmative action policy disproportionately benefits male 
students when male applicants are awarded points based solely on 
their gender.  This factor correlates to the flexibility of the affirmative 
action policy since a flexible plan that individually evaluates 
candidates decreases the likelihood that a policy would 
disproportionately benefit male students.173  A mechanized process 
that awards points to all male students based solely on their gender, 
on the other hand, would fail this prong of the test.174  A plan that 
considered only an applicant’s gender would put females at an unfair 
advantage in applying for admission.  Though an affirmative action 
policy benefiting males may only affect a small number of students, 
the impact is substantial for those individuals.  While many females 
would not choose the adversative method of instruction used at VMI, 
the impact for those individuals denied admission based solely on 
their gender is enormous.175  Similarly, a disproportionate point 
advantage for male students based solely on their gender would 
prevent qualified females from being offered admission solely 
because they were born a certain gender.176  By using gender as a 
decisive factor in a student’s application, the college would deny 
                                                          
 172. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 550 (explaining that some women are qualified and 
would seek out the adversative method employed by VMI, yet they are denied this 
opportunity based solely on assumptions made about their gender). 
 173. See id. at 540-41 (asserting that colleges’ individual analysis of each student’s 
application takes account of their personal strengths and weaknesses and 
consequently allows the admissions committee to admit the most qualified 
applicants). 
 174. Cf. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273-74 (holding that colleges’ affirmative action policies 
must evaluate each applicant based on their individual contribution to diversity). 
 175. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 542 (concluding that the question should be “not 
whether ‘women or men should be forced to attend VMI’; rather, the question is 
whether the Commonwealth can constitutionally deny to women who have the will 
and capacity, the training and attendant opportunities that VMI uniquely affords”). 
 176. Cf. id. at 550-51 (arguing that female students must be evaluated according to 
the same criteria as male applicants). 
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more qualified applicants the chance to attend the institution to 
satisfy an amorphous goal of gender proportionality.177 
d.  Colleges must consider and reject gender neutral alternatives before 
adopting an affirmative action policy that benefits male applicants 
Many colleges and universities have used alternatives to formal 
affirmative action policies, including targeted recruitment programs, 
changes in advertising materials, and the addition of sports teams to 
attract male students.178  While colleges should employ gender-neutral 
alternatives before implementing a formal affirmative action policy, 
the targeted recruitment policies that schools use are often based on 
stereotypes and cannot be considered neutral alternatives. 
Colleges’ reliance on gender stereotypes leads to a skewed 
perception of gender roles, potentially exacerbating gender 
discrimination in society.179  The University of Michigan Law School 
attempted to eliminate similar discrimination by adopting an 
admissions policy that fosters diversity-as-integration.180  However, 
instead of facilitating integration, colleges’ reliance on stereotypes in 
the implementation of recruitment policies, hampers progress by 
constructing individuals’ roles in society based solely on their gender 
without regard to their abilities.181  The Supreme Court declared 
reliance on gender stereotypes unconstitutional because each 
individual should be evaluated based on his or her own 
qualifications.182  Therefore, in targeting admissions materials to 
attract more male students, the college should not rely solely on 
stereotypes; rather, these attempts should focus on providing 
educational opportunities to all students. 
                                                          
 177. Cf. id. (concluding that VMI could not deny admission to female applicants 
based on gender stereotypes about their abilities when some female applicants may 
be better qualified than the average male). 
 178. See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text (describing colleges’ targeted 
recruitment campaigns aimed at increasing the enrollment of male students). 
 179. Cf. VMI, 518 U.S. at 543 n.12 (explaining that stereotypes about women’s 
abilities led to discriminatory policies that excluded women from various prestigious 
professions, including law and medicine); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 
718, 729-30 (1982) (asserting that denying males admission to the nursing school 
perpetuates the view that nursing is a female occupation, which leads to the denial of 
other opportunities for women). 
 180. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327-28 (2003); see also Bulman-Pozen, supra 
note 114, at 1415 (arguing that diverse universities will encourage diversity in society 
by “preparing students to work in ‘an increasingly diverse workforce’” and participate 
in the community as informed American citizens). 
 181. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 541-42 (noting that judgments about people based on 
overbroad generalizations are likely to “perpetuate historical patterns of 
discrimination”). 
 182. See id. at 541 (holding that states must avoid the use of fixed notions about 
gender roles when making classifications based on sex). 
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To implement a plan that is substantially related to the goal of 
diversity, the admissions committee must include flexible admissions 
criteria that evaluate each individual’s unique contribution to the 
class and the college community.183  The Court required VMI to 
evaluate each female applicant to determine her fitness for its unique 
adversative environment and did not allow the school to reject all 
female applicants simply because most would find the environment 
unsuitable.184  Reliance on stereotypes about the proper role of men 
and women or the perceived strengths and interests of the male sex 
leads to segregation rather than the integrated community that 
colleges should seek to foster.185  Since colleges administrators have 
not asserted a rationale for the affirmative action policy, other than 
gender proportionality, and have relied on gender stereotypes, the 
policies do not meet the requirements of intermediate scrutiny.  
3.  Applicability of the gender equality framework to challenges brought under 
state anti-discrimination statutes 
In addition to the federal remedies previously discussed, state 
statutes that prohibit gender discrimination in educational 
institutions provide a remedy for female students to challenge 
affirmative action policies that benefit male students.186  Although 
courts often use analogous federal case law as instructive precedent,187 
state statutes can offer broader remedies to students to the extent 
that the statutory language differs from Title IX.188  For purposes of 
analysis, this Section will look at the language of the Minnesota 
Human Rights Act (“MHRA”),189 although the analysis would be 
                                                          
 183. See supra notes 153, 165 and accompanying text (describing the need for 
admissions criteria to evaluate each applicant based on his or her individual 
qualifications).  
 184. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 550-51 (holding that VMI must admit qualified female 
students). 
 185. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 114, at 1415-16 (explaining that the diversity-as-
integration doctrine fosters community and eliminates discrimination in contrast to 
the diversity-as-difference doctrine that relies on stereotypes about the backgrounds 
of certain students). 
 186. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (arguing that state remedies are 
important because some state statutes contain language that will allow private rights 
of action against private colleges). 
 187. See Fahey v. Avnet Inc., 525 N.W.2d 568, 572 (Minn. 1994) (explaining that 
state courts often use federal precedent of analogous federal statutes to analyze 
claims under the MHRA). 
 188. Cf. Todd v. Ortho Biotech Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that although the courts often look to Title VII case law, in the context of sex 
discrimination in the employment setting, when construing the MHRA, the court will 
apply the plain language of the statute when it differs from developments in federal 
case law). 
 189. The author uses the MHRA for purposes of analysis since this Act had the 
largest body of case law construing the scope of the Act. 
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similar under other state statutes with prohibitions against sex 
discrimination in educational institutions.190 
Because state statutes were enacted to offer additional protection 
for students,191 it is likely that courts would conduct a searching 
inquiry to examine whether the school had a compelling state 
interest in diversity rather than an interest in merely attempting to 
balance the colleges’ proportion of male and female students.192  A 
mere attempt at gender balancing would clearly fail under strict 
scrutiny, especially if a court forced a college to articulate support for 
its assertion that gender diversity constitutes a compelling state 
interest.193  To pass constitutional muster, a court would require 
colleges to assert a particular need to implement an affirmative 
action policy for male students that was free from gender stereotypes 
about the capabilities of men and women.194 
Additionally, a college would need to articulate that this plan was 
narrowly tailored to achieve its goal of gender diversity.195  While a 
plan that awards points to male applicants based solely on their 
gender would clearly fail this prong of the test, other practices may 
also violate state statutes.196  For example, some colleges have 
instituted a policy that extends a phone call to all admitted male 
students, but school representatives do not call all of the accepted 
female students.197  The MHRA articulates that it is “an unfair 
                                                          
 190. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-307 (2006) (prohibiting educational 
institutions from excluding, expelling, limiting, or otherwise discriminating against 
prospective students or current students on the basis of sex); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 20-13-22 (2001) (declaring that it is unfair and discriminatory for educational 
institutions to include or expel students on the basis of sex). 
 191. See MINN. STAT. § 363A.02 (2001) (stating that “[i]t is the public policy of this 
state to secure for persons in this state, freedom from discrimination . . . in education 
because of . . . sex . . .”). 
 192. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court’s 
reluctance to accept a school’s asserted objective for a policy that distinguishes 
among applicants based on sex). 
 193. Cf. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga. (Johnson I), 106 F. Supp. 2d 
1362, 1376 n.10 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (rejecting a gender affirmative action policy where 
the school could not support its asserted objective of the need for an affirmative 
action policy with substantive educational data), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 194. Cf. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982) (holding that 
although the school may articulate a benign purpose for the policy, courts must 
evaluate the plan to see if “the alleged objective is the actual purpose underlying the 
discriminatory classification”). 
 195. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (describing that state courts often 
look to federal precedent analyzing analogous federal statutes; therefore, the state 
court would likely apply the same level of scrutiny as the federal courts).   
 196. Cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1989) (rejecting the 
University of California’s use of a quota system to achieve racial diversity). 
 197. See Peter Y. Hong, Gender Gap Growing on College Campuses, THE SEATTLE TIMES, 
Dec. 1, 2004, A11 (quoting the Vice President of Admissions at Santa Clara University 
stating that “[w]e make a special pitch to [males] to talk about the benefits of Santa 
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discriminatory practice to exclude, expel, or otherwise discriminate 
against a person seeking admission as a student . . . because of . . . 
sex.”198  Thus, this type of preferential treatment to a particular class 
of applicants based solely on their sex could constitute the “other” 
type of discrimination that the statute expressly prohibits.  While such 
an admissions practice might not violate Title IX, it would likely 
violate the MHRA, and similar state statutes, because of the 
additional level of protection that these statutes provide. 
State statutes, like the MHRA, can accomplish the goals of VMI and 
Hogan by creating educational environments that allow all students to 
achieve their potential.  State courts can achieve the underlying 
purpose of the decisions in VMI and Hogan—individualized analysis 
of students based on their actual qualifications regardless of 
stereotypes—by interpreting their state statutes and constitutions to 
provide greater protection from gender discrimination. 
CONCLUSION 
Due to the differences between racial affirmative action policies 
and affirmative action programs that benefit male students, courts 
must use a different framework to evaluate affirmative action policies 
benefiting male students.  Courts must analyze this issue differently 
because males have not historically suffered from discrimination, and 
the Supreme Court has not identified males as a discrete and insular 
minority who should receive a greater level of protection.  Therefore, 
while the opinions of Grutter and Gratz provide some guidance to 
courts in confronting the issue of gender affirmative action 
programs, the analysis of these opinions should not be wholly 
adopted and instead the Court’s gender discrimination cases should 
govern the analysis. 
The opinions of VMI and Hogan provide a framework that requires 
schools to articulate a specific justification for policies that 
discriminate based on sex and that will not defer to colleges’ mere 
assertion that the school needs gender proportionality.  The 
proposed framework evaluates the affirmative action policies based 
on (1) whether the college relies on gender stereotypes and 
(2) whether the aim of the school’s policy is diversity rather than 
gender proportionality.  College administrators have not articulated 
substantive pedagogical justifications for the need to use affirmative 
                                                          
Clara, as we do for other underrepresented groups” due to “fear that lopsided male-
female ratios will hurt the social life and diverse classrooms [used] as selling points”). 
 198. MINN. STAT. § 363A.13 (2001). 
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action to increase the percentage of males on campus.  
Undergraduate institutions have instead used targeted recruitment 
programs that rely on gender stereotypes to enroll a class with equal 
proportions of male and female students.199  While colleges should 
encourage innovative thought and progress, institutions with 
affirmative action policies benefiting males are charting a course 
toward the past by promoting gender stereotypes and inequality.   
 
                                                          
 199. See supra notes 141-143 and accompanying text (explaining that college 
administrators relied on social concerns about the gender imbalance rather than 
asserting a legitimate pedagogical objective for the policy). 
